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WHOSE PARTNERSHIP IS IT ANYWAY?: REVISING THE
REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT'S
DUTY-OF-CARE TERM
MICHAEL L. KEELEY*
The problem in designing the appropriate [partnership] statute is
that partnership relationships (and, accordingly, the costs and bene-
fits of particular [default] rules) are as variable as the types of busi-
nesses that adopt the partnership form. There is little resemblance
between a small family farm and a big-city law partnership.
1
INTRODUCTION
The above quoted language is taken from Professors Bromberg and
Ribstein's leading treatise on partnership,2 which concludes that
where the default rules3 family farmers expect conflict with the default
rules big-city lawyers expect, the ideal partnership statute should
* I thank Professor Steve Thel for his assistance with this Note.
1. Alan R. Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein, Bromberg and Ribstein on Partner-
ship § 1.01(d), at 1:12-:13 (1988).
2. The Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership as "an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." Unif. Partnership
Act § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 1 (1969) [hereinafter UPA]; the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act § 202(a) regulates the creation of a partnership, stating "the association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit creates a partnership,
whether or not the persons intended to create a partnership." Revised Unif. Partner-
ship Act § 202(a) (1992) [hereinafter RUPA].
3. "Default terms" are mechanisms that enable courts to enforce contracts and
agreements that are silent or indefinite regarding a term or terms. Traditional default
term doctrine teaches that default terms are pre-set and apply unless the parties con-
tract for a different term. For some of the recent works on default terms, see Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 Yale LJ. 87 (1989); Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory
Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 Harv. J.L
& Pub. Pol'y 639 (1989); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Princi-
ple: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 Va. L. Rev. 967 (1983)
[hereinafter The Mitigation Principle]; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles
of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981) [hereinafter Principles]; Lawrcnce
Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent Theory, 54 Mont. L Rev. 169
(1993). Most commentators agree that default terms should be created to match what
the parties would have chosen had they addressed the issue. Coleman, et al., supra, at
165. This Note argues that it is impossible to consistently supply terms that the parties
would have bargained to in a default system which applies the same term in every
factual situation. The weakness lies not in trying to determine what the parties would
have bargained to; rather the weakness is in setting the gap-filler before examining
the facts of each individual case. Setting the default term before examining the facts
of a case makes it impossible to consistently supply the term the parties would have
bargained to unless all parties that fail to supply a certain term would have bargained
to exactly the same result. This is especially true in partnership law, because partner-
ships are formed for a wide variety of reasons, such as tax savings, convenience or
tradition, and operate in tremendously varied circumstances.
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strive to embody terms that reflect the farmers' expectations.' Profes-
sors Bromberg and Ribstein, by endorsing the sacrifice of the expecta-
tions of Goliath for those of David, recognize that no single default
rule5 can meet the expectations of all partnerships,6 and embrace an
approach that purports to meet the expectations of all partnerships
except large ones.7 Large partnerships, such as the big-city law firm
are expected to protect themselves through contract.8 Therefore,
although a single default term may not be consistent with the expecta-
tions of all partnerships, 9 Bromberg and Ribstein believe that a prop-
erly selected single default term can overcome this problem.
Drawing distinctions among the expectations of partnerships based
solely on their size, however, ignores the host of other factors that
influence the terms those who form partnerships expect. Because
people form partnerships for highly individualized reasons, partner-
ships have widely varied expectations regarding how they will operate.
Therefore, when a partnership fails to specify a term in its partnership
agreement, or has no partnership agreement, a single default term
may not consistently meet partnership expectations even among small
partnerships. Categorization based solely on size, therefore, is
inappropriate.
Take, for example, two medical partnerships, each composed of
three doctors.' ° In the case of the first partnership, the three doctors
attended medical school together and have full confidence in each
other's competence as doctors. Their primary motivation for combin-
ing practices was to decrease their individual risk of incurring a large
malpractice judgment capable of putting any one of them out of busi-
ness. The fact that they formed the partnership expecting to share the
4. The term the partnership "expects" is the term the partners would have agreed
to had they addressed the issue.
5. A "single default standard" is one that, unless contracted around, supplies the
same term in all factual situations. See Steve Thel, Bromberg and Ribstein on Partner-
ship, 45 Bus. Law. 1381, 1384 n.16 (1990) (book review). One example is RUPA
§ 404(d) which states that, unless otherwise agreed, partners are held to a standard of
care assigning individual liability only after a finding of gross negligence or reckless-
ness. RUPA, supra note 2, § 404(d).
6. For the sake of readability, this Note refers to the expectations of "the partner-
ship" when referring to the collective intent of the partners at the time of formation.
Obviously, a partnership is a creation of law and can no more have an "intent" than
can a corporation or a trust.
7. See Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 1, § 1.01(d), at 1:11; see also Thel, supra
note 5, at 1383 & n.11 (noting that Bromberg and Ribstein support the tailoring of
gap-fillers to contain the terms small, uncounseled partnerships would expect).
8. Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 1, § 1.01(d), at 1:11.
9. The partnership form of business organization has become increasingly popu-
lar in recent years. In 1970, there were 936,000 partnerships in the United States; by
1985, the number had increased to 1,714,000 with total receipts of $302,733,000. U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 495-98 tbls. 823-29
(1988).
10. Part III.C expands this hypothetical.
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risks of their negligence makes it reasonable for a court to fill a gap,1
in their partnership agreement regarding the standard of care, 2 with a
low standard of care such as gross negligence. Under such a standard,
losses occurring due to the ordinary negligence of one doctor will be
shared by all three. Just as the doctors share in each other's profits,
they share in each other's losses that are due to ordinary negligence-
giving them what they expected going into the partnership-a less
risky practice.
In the second partnership, the three doctors are brothers who
formed a partnership because it was their father's dying wish. The
youngest brother, unfortunately, is a lousy doctor. The older brothers
likely would have insisted on a higher standard of care (had they ad-
dressed the issue) to govern their practice-perhaps one of ordinary
care-to protect themselves from sharing the burden of expected fre-
quent malpractice judgments against the least-skilled brother/doctor.
Thus, one factual disparity can make a single default term inade-
quate for consistently meeting partnership expectations. The need to
discern the expectations of the parties in the gap-filling process arises
from the need to provide a neutral enforcer of private agreements.
Fairness or efficiency concerns cannot be the basis of a court's depar-
ture from meeting the expectations of the partnership. If a court en-
ters into a reallocation of rights, thereby interfering with the private
ordering arranged by the partners, then it has overstepped its bounds.
Courts must recognize partnership expectations as legitimate concerns
in gap-filling and tailor its gap-fillers accordingly. For example, some
business people choose the partnership form because of the tax ad-
vantages partnerships receive under the Internal Revenue Code,13
11. Partnerships frequently form, operate and dissolve without intervention by
legislatures or courts. The only situation where a court is called upon to "fill a gap" is
where there is a dispute implicating issues covered by neither the law of partnerships
nor the partnership agreement, regardless of whether that agreement is written, oral
or implied.
12. The "standard of care" is the degree of care partners must exercise in their
actions to avoid liability to the partnership and to the other partners. Only a court or
a legislature may determine the duty the partners and the partnership owes to third
persons.
13. Under the Internal Revenue Code, partnership income is not taxed until it is
distributed to the partners. See I.R.C. § 701 (1988). An association, to qualify for
partnership tax status, must more resemble a partnership than a corporation. This
status is evaluated under the factors laid out in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S.
344, 353-55 (1935) (listing four factors to be weighed in the corporate resemblance
test); see also A.H.M. Daniels, Issues in International Partnership Taxation 10-11
(1991) (tracing the evolution of the corporate resemblance test).
A corporation's owners-the shareholders-are taxed twice on their income; once
when earned by the corporation, and then again when the earnings are distributed to
the shareholders in the form of taxable dividends. Partnership has the advantage of
being a transparent pass-through organization.
As a general rule, the partnership is the most advantageous form of entity
for federal income tax purposes. The partnership's major advantages over
the "C" corporation are the following: (1) partners may deduct any partner-
1994]
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while others do so to obtain high fiduciary duties among owners,' 4
while still others choose partnership because it is often easier to form
a partnership than to form a corporation.' 5
Partnership law has been governed by the Uniform Partnership Act
("UPA") for over sixty years. Recently, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"), the group that
drafted the original UPA and the Uniform Commercial Code, drafted
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA")' 6 to replace certain
sections of the UPA they believe are outdated.'7 There is currently a
debate among scholars over what standard-of-care default term the
RUPA should contain.' 8
The UPA, while silent on the issue of the duty of care among part-
ners, has been interpreted by courts to impose a duty of "ordinary
care" on partners in the absence of a specified term to the contrary. 19
Conversely, the RUPA supplies a lower standard-of-care term similar
to corporate law's "business-judgment rule."20 Both of these gap-fill-
ers are single default terms. Such single default terms cannot consist-
ship losses on their own income tax returns, whereas a corporation's tax
losses cannot be deducted by shareholders; and (2) the use of the partner-
ship form avoids the potential double taxation that may result from the use
of the C corporation.
Glenn B. Davis et al., Choice of Entity: Legal Considerations of Selection A-7 (1990).
A partnership, however, is required to file a return with the I.R.S., setting forth its
gains, losses and accounting methods. I.R.C. § 6031 (1988).
14. Claire Moore Dickerson, Is it Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts:
Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 111,
148-49 (1993).
15. Partnerships may be formed by informal agreement of the partners. Bromberg
& Ribstein, supra note 1, § 1.01(b), at 1:2. Corporations, however, must file with the
state of incorporation, have a charter, officers and other statutorily required elements.
Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 101(a) (1993) (corporations must file a certificate of incorpo-
ration); Model Business Corp. Act § 1.20 (1993) (same); Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141,
142 (1993) (requiring corporations to have officers and directors); Model Business
Corp. Act § 8.01, 8.03, 8.40 (1993) (same).
16. RUPA, supra note 2.
17. See UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unin-
corporated Business Organizations, Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised?,
43 Bus. Law. 121 (1987); Donald J. Weidner, A Perspective to Reconsider Partnership
Law, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
18. Compare Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Duty of Care: The Partnership Cases, 15
Okla. City U. L. Rev. 753 (1990) and Dickerson, supra note 13, at 141-43 (stating that
unless otherwise agreed, partners are to be held to an ordinary care standard) with
Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 1, § 6.07(0, at 6:85 (stating that unless otherwise
agreed, partners' acts are to be judged under a gross negligence standard).
19. See, e.g., Flynn v. Reaves, 218 S.E.2d 661, 663 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (applying
ordinary care standard in medical malpractice suit and disallowing negligent partner's
suit against partnership for indemnification); Kiffer v. Bienstock, 218 N.Y.S. 526, 528
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1926) (applying ordinary care standard where partner's negligence
caused car accident and disallowing negligent partner's suit for contribution); United
Brokers' Co. v. Dose, 22 P.2d 204, 205 (Or. 1933) (same).
20. The RUPA standard allows a negligent partner to seek indemnification from
her partners where she has individually paid a judgment arising out of her act relating
to the partnership business so long as she has not engaged in "grossly negligent or
612 [Vol. 63
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ently meet partnership expectations because they supply the same
standard of care in all cases.2'
To accommodate the different needs of different partnerships, state
legislatures must tailor their standard-of-care gap-fillers to meet part-
nership expectations as closely as possible. The tailored gap-filler
should strive to minimize the added expense of the process to courts
and litigants resulting from the need to conduct a factual inquiry. To
meet this goal, legislatures should replace RUPA section 404(d) with a
provision that is textured to apply different gap-fillers in different sce-
narios.' Such an approach would enable courts to meet partner ex-
pectations while minimizing added costs to litigants and courts
associated with a gap-filling provision that accounts for factual
disparities.
This Note's proposals emphasize respect for party autonomy and
expectations in the gap-filling process. Part I analyzes the need to
meet party expectations when gap-filling. Part II explains why single
default terms generally cannot meet those party expectations. Part II
analyzes the debate between the advocates of an ordinary care stan-
dard and those who favor the application of the business-judgment
rule to partnerships. This part utilizes a hypothetical to illustrate the
fact that the single default terms advocated by both sides of the de-
bate are incapable of meeting partnership expectations. Part IV pro-
poses an amendment to RUPA section 404(d) that would enable
courts to adjust the standard of care gap-filler to reflect partnership
expectations.
I. MEETING PARTNERSHIP EXPECTATIONS IS THE KEY TO
LEGITIMATE JUDICIAL GAP-FILLING
This section explains that to legitimize judicial gap-filling and en-
sure the orderly functioning of partnerships, it is crucial that the
RUPA's gap-fillers be consistent with the expectations of
partnerships.3
reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law." Id.
§ 404(d).
21. See Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 178 (1992); Kalevitch, supra note 3,
at 171.
22. Courts often make the similar determination of the level of skill to which a
professional is to be held-ordinary care or extreme care. See W. Page Keeton et al.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 32, at 187 & n.39 (5th ed. 1984); see also
Coyne v. Cirilli, 607 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (applying expert standard to
podiatrist because foot doctor is a "specialist" as a matter of law); Baker v. Story, 621
S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) ("The evidence in this case justifies the conclu-
sion that Dr. Story was a specialist in the field of neurosurgery, so that he would be
held to a higher standard than that which would be applied to [a non-specialist].").
23. This Note sometimes refers to "parties" instead of "partners." This is because
the literature on default terms is not specifically addressed to partnerships. The rea-
soning of the literature, however applies to partnership as a contractual relationship.
1994]
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While some scholars take the position that courts should never sup-
ply gap-fillers on the grounds that doing so violates the principle of
party autonomy,24 most recognize that default terms are invaluable
because they increase the flexibility of parties operating under long-
term agreements.25 Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the
wide range of unexpected contingencies that can and do arise during
the performance of long-term contracts and agreements. 26 Moreover,
gap-fillers decrease the cost of contracting by allowing the parties to
avoid negotiating a term for every possible contingency;27 addition-
ally, parties to an "incomplete" contract can address future contingen-
cies without being hampered by a rigid agreement. 2
More importantly, especially in the case of partnerships formed
without a formal agreement, 29 the standard-of-care term will be one of
the most important default terms partners seek to enforce. When an
informal arrangement goes sour, and litigation ensues over the actions
of the partners, the standard of care to which the partners are held
must come from a gap-filler. A court should and will fill in gaps to
enforce incomplete partnership agreements if it finds that the partners
24. See Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 176-82.
25. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 822 (1992).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. Professor Barnett has stated: "Many foreseeable contingencies, given
their low probability, are better off left unnegotiated ex ante in the hopes that they
will not materialize or will be handled cooperatively ex post if they do." Id.
29. Partnerships formed without the specific intent to do so are sometimes called
inadvertent partnerships. J. Dennis Hynes, Agency and Partnership: Cases, Materials,
Problems 457 (1989). The law treats such an association as a partnership even though
the "partners" never specifically intended to create a partnership. The law only re-
quires that the "partners" have the general intent to form "an association." Bromberg
& Ribstein, supra note 1, § 2.01, at 2:1. Bromberg and Ribstein explain in their trea-
tise as follows:
[D]efining partnership in terms of intent leaves open the question of what
must be intended. Clearly, it is neither necessary nor sufficient in all circum-
stances for the parties to call their relationship a "partnership." Such a rule
would not adequately address situations involving very informal relation-
ships and would permit the parties to evade unwanted consequences of part-
nership vis-A-vis third parties by the simple expedient of choosing some
other name for their relationship.
Id. See also Waugh v. Carver, 126 Eng. Rep. 525 (Ct. Comm. Pl. 1793). In Waugh, the
court explained that:
It is plain upon the construction of the agreement, if it be construed only
between the [parties to the agreement], that they were not nor ever meant to
be partners. They meant each house to carry on trade without risk of each
other, and to be at their own loss .... That was the agreement between
themselves. But the question is, whether they have not, by parts of their
agreement, constituted themselves partners in respect to other persons?
Id. at 532.
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intended to be bound by their agreement.30 It does not follow,
though, that a court has free reign to supply terms ad hoc to fill the
void; rather, a court's legitimacy rests on its ability to supply a term
consistent with the partnership's expectations.31
One might argue, however, that when the members 32 of a partner-
ship select the partnership format, they consent to their relations with
each other being judged by standards set by the state in the form of
mandatory terms.33 But academic circles have rejected the wisdom of
having mandatory terms, and most statutory schemes have abandoned
them as well.34
There is, however, scholarly debate about how to best select default
terms. There is general agreement, though, that default terms should
be set to reflect "what the parties would have wanted"-othervise
known as the parties' "hypothetical intent." Hypothetical intent is a
presumed intent used to approximate the parties' actual intentions
and to provide a justification for inserting state-created terms into a
30. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (12th ed. 1990) (stating that incomplete contracts
should be enforced if the parties intended to contract and there is a reasonably certain
basis for shaping a remedy).
31. See Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 170-72.
32. For purposes of readability, this Note sometimes refers to the partners as
"members."
33. "Mandatory terms" are synonymous with "non-waivable provisions." In the
partnership context, this includes the duty of good faith and fair dealing. RUPA, supra
note 2, § 103(b)(5). Mandatory terms cannot be contracted around no matter how
honestly the parties desire it.
34. See, e.g., RUPA, supra note 2, § 103(b) (stating the general policy of allowing
the RUPA to be contracted around and listing the only unalterable provisions of the
RUPA); U.C.C., supra note 29, § 1-102(3) (stating that all provisions of the U.C.C. are
avoidable through contract except the duty of good faith). A discussion draft of the
RUPA also evinces support for abandoning mandatory terms. The revision commit-
tee stated that the RUPA provisions should be default terms with respect to the re-
spective rights of the partners. See Revised Uniform Partnership Act (Discussion
Draft 1989), reprinted in Alan R. Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein, Bromberg and Rib-
stein on Partnership 44 (Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Discussion Draft]. Specifically, the
RUPA enables partners to modify or eliminate all duties except for the duties of good
faith, fair dealing, and loyalty. RUPA, supra note 2, § 103(b)(4) & (5). Under the
RUPA, the duty of care may be reduced from its default level of "gross negligence or
recklessness," so long as the reduction is reasonable. Id. § 103(b)(4). This standard is
in accord with the law and economics position. See Dickerson, supra note 13, at 148-
49. Professor Dickerson commented on the overall approach of the RUPA towards
the duty of care stating:
A last means of avoiding the duty of care is found in RUPA section
103(b)(4). It provides only that partners cannot "unreasonably reduce the
duty of care." Admittedly, it may be difficult to show that a prospective
waiver is in good faith, represents fair dealing, and is not unreasonable if it
extends to a cause of action arising out of a particular partner's willful mis-
conduct. However, it is easier to contemplate an enforceable provision pro-
tecting a party from his or her own reckless or negligent conduct or ordinary
negligence. After all, if a standard of good faith or fair dealing is itself atten-
uated, that standard may be compatible even with a waiver of liability for
reckless behavior.
Id. at 148.
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private agreement. The argument goes, if the parties would have con-
sented to the term supplied by default, then it is almost as if the par-
ties did consent to it. There is a trade-off involved that allows the
court to enforce agreements that parties intended to be binding, even
though the parties failed to specify terms. The court, thereby, intrudes
on party autonomy to enforce party intent.35
Beyond the general agreement that default terms should be set to
reflect "what the parties would have wanted," scholars sometimes dis-
agree about the proper "parties" on whose expectations default terms
should focus.3 6 Hypothesizing "what the parties would have done" en-
ables courts to enforce agreements that the parties intended to be en-
forceable.37 A serious problem arises, however, where the default
terms are set by seeking the hypothetical intent of hypothetical parties
instead of the hypothetical intent of the actual parties. The search for
a default term that reflects the expectations of hypothetical parties,
(e.g., parties who always act "efficiently" or "fairly") delegitimizes the
role of courts as gap-fillers.38
When the parties have made a private agreement-an independent
ordering of their respective rights and responsibilities-a court's
proper role is that of neutral enforcer of the agreement.39 Because
courts must not favor one party over another, courts may take the
necessary step of hypothesizing what the actual parties would have
done; however, hypothesizing what hypothetical parties would have
done is a step away from the parties' actual intent not justified by the
need to fill gaps.
States, therefore, should amend the RUPA standard-of-care term to
allow their trial courts to more closely approximate actual partnership
expectations. Just as the Uniform Commercial Code4" and the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts4' have adopted flexible default stan-
dards for commonly omitted terms, the RUPA can create its own
more flexible gap-filling process to honor partnership expectations.
States must recognize when considering the adoption of the RUPA
that no single default rule for the standard of care among partners can
effectively or consistently meet partnership expectations.
35. Id. But see Barnett, supra note 24, at 859 (espousing a theory that the parties'
act of contracting indicates their consent to the gap-filling process of the jurisdiction
in total).
36. Compare Coleman, supra note 20, at 164-66 (courts should supply the hypo-
thetical intent of the actual parties) with Dickerson, supra note 13, at 152-53 (courts
should apply ordinary care-the presumed intent of hypothetical parties).
37. Coleman, supra note 20, at 166-67.
38. See infra part II.
39. See Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 179 ("Contract rests on autonomy and actual
assent as [its] moral basis . . ").
40. See U.C.C., supra note 29, § 2-204(3).
41. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 204 (1979).
616 [Vol. 63
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II. SINGLE DEFAULT TERMS CANNOT CONSISTENTLY MEET
PARTNERSHIP EXPECTATIONS
This section discusses why single default rules cannot be designed to
meet partnership expectations. As discussed in part I, a gap-filler
should meet the actual partners' hypothetical intent because that is
the best way to maintain respect for the partners when gap-filling.
In the partnership context, utilizing the actual partners' hypothetical
intent strikes a balance between the important goal of enforcing con-
tracts that the partners intended to be binding, and the similarly im-
portant goal of respecting partner autonomy. Professor Coleman
argues for the use of the actual parties' hypothetical consent as
follows:
The duties the parties have explicitly imposed on one another are
legitimately enforced against them because they are the terms to
which the parties have actually consented. The default rule imposes
rights and responsibilities to which the parties would have con-
sented. When securing the actual consent of negotiating parties is
impossible, determining what they would have agreed to is the best
alternative. Hypothetical consent is a proxy for actual consent.
Therefore, to the same extent and in the same way that consent
justifies a court imposing the rights and responsibilities made ex-
plicit in a contract, hypothetical consent justifies imposing the rights
and responsibilities that are implied by the application of the de-
fault rule.42
Nevertheless, because different partnerships operate with different
priorities in factually disparate situations,4 3 a single default term-
even one premised on "hypothetical intent," or "what the partnership
would have wanted"-cannot be justified on grounds of meeting part-
nership expectations. The validity of such a premise requires an un-
realistic assumption that all partnerships have identical wills."
Consequently, a textured gap-filler provision is required, because only
a such a provision can account for the circumstances surrounding the
formation and operation of each partnership, and supply a term con-
sistent with the partnership's expectations.45
42. Coleman, supra note 20, at 167; see also Coleman et al., supra note 3, at 639
("Coercive civil authority is justifiably employed to enforce contractual obligations
because the parties have agreed so to constrain themselves.").
43. See Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 171; see also Coleman, supra note 20, at 178
(stating that each party seeks to maximize his or her utility).
44. See Coleman, supra note 20, at 178; Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 171.
45. Some claim, however, that default terms need not be set to meet party expec-
tations. Barnett, supra note 24, at 823. These commentators argue that by con-
tracting, and by failing to specify a term themselves, parties consent to having courts
fill whatever gaps they leave with pre-set, single default terms; hence, one default
term is as justified as any other. Id at 823. Parties must be aware of a default rule to
"consent" to its imposition. See Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 190. Professor Kalevitch
stated:
1994]
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For instance, the U.C.C. has gap-fillers which are flexibly applied by
courts. Section 2-305 provides that where the parties fail to specify
the contract price, the court shall determine a reasonable price.46 The
U.C.C. also provides gap-fillers that require the determination of a
reasonable time.47 The reasonableness standard gives a court wide
latitude to examine the facts of each case in determining what the
parties intended.
When a court interprets a partnership agreement, the rules of con-
tract interpretation apply, and the primary goal must be to discern the
actual intent of the parties and to give it effect.48 Parties to a contract
need not jump through linguistic hoops to give their intentions legal
significance.49 Courts will now look to the circumstances surrounding
a contract,50 admit parol evidence51 and look beyond form to sub-
stance 52 to give effect to the parties' intent. This is evidence of the
importance attached to discerning the actual intent of the parties in
court.
Though it is impracticable to conduct an individualized probe into
the actual parties' actual intent, abandoning the search for the hypo-
thetical intent of the actual parties is not justified. 3 Thus, when creat-
The kinds of default rules a consent theory of contract may adopt are differ-
ent when the parties to a contract are knowledgeable or ignorant of the de-
fault rule.... [I]f the parties either have no reason to know the default rule
.. . then the state may only adopt conventional default rules that match
conventional expectations. In contrast, any default rule may be adopted for
knowledgeable parties.
Id. Cf Zenichi Shishido, The Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held Corpora-
tions, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 65, 94 (1993) (stating that parties must know of penalty
default rules for court to legitimately insert them into incomplete contract). Most
partnerships, however, are formed informally, with little or no consideration of the
UPA. See Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 1, § 2.01(a), at 2:1; Dickerson, supra note
13, at 154; Thel, supra note 5, at 1383. Thus, the required knowledge of the default
rules does not exist during the formation of many partnerships. See id. at 1384.
Regardless, partnership is contractual, see Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 1,
§ 1.01(d), at 1:11, and the same factors that support the elimination of non-waivable
terms, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text, also support tailoring the
RUPA's standard-of-care term to meet partnership expectations by designing it to
account for disparate factual circumstances.
46. See U.C.C., supra note 29, § 2-305(1).
47. Id. § 2-309(1).
48. See Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 179 (arguing for a "will" theory of contracts
grounded in supreme respect for party autonomy). This Note addresses situations
where the parties did not foresee the need for the missing term, or consciously did not
address it, because of transaction costs that exceeded the utility of bargaining to such
a term, thus leaving no expressed or implied intent to discover.
49. See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 3-12, at 171
(3d ed. 1987) ("Under Corbin's rules all relevant extrinsic evidence is admissible on
the issue of meaning including evidence of subjective intention and what the parties
said to each other with respect to meaning.").
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Coleman, supra note 20, at 167.
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ing a gap-filler, the goal should be to meet the actual parties' actual
intent as closely as possible. This is done by having the trial judge
hypothesize what the actual partners would have done.'
Professor Coleman explained the flaw in straying too far from the
search for a term that reflects the actual or hypothetical intent of the
actual parties:
[R]eal agents do not find themselves in anything like ideal circum-
stances. Their actual bargain reflects the reality of their situation;
so should any hypothetical bargain struck between them.... In-
stead of completing, even in an attenuated sense, the contract be-
tween the [actual] parties, the principle of ideal rational bargaining
is just a mask for the real principle: the principle of efficiency. 55
This masking also appears in default terms that purport to supply the
"fair" default term. A court providing the "fair" term is not enforcing
the parties undeclared decision to come to "fair" terms. Rather, the
court is supplying the "fair" term to be fair.56 Abandoning the search
for the actual parties' hypothetical intent results in an unjustified in-
crease in expectation costs (defined as the costs of lost court legiti-
macy and public confidence in the sanctity of contract).57
The law and economics scholars attempt to prevent inefficiencies in
the partnership's operations when gap-filling by hypothesizing what
the parties would have done had they been ideally situated. Such a
method of gap-filling is sometimes justified on the grounds that be-
cause default terms should mirror the parties' intent as closely as pos-
sible, and because all parties desire terms that maximize their joint
wealth, a court should supply the jointly efficient term.58 But clearly,
the concept of contract as a joint-wealth maximizer does not mean
that all transactions produce the most joint-wealth possible. 59
A prime example of this is where one party to an agreement has
superior, but legitimate, bargaining power. If a court ignores the su-
perior bargaining position of one party, and fills the gap with its idea
of the "jointly efficient" term, the chosen term probably will not be
the term the parties would have bargained to had they addressed the
54. The goal must be to match the gap-filler with one of the terms below, in de-
scending order.
1) The actual intent of the actual parties;
2) The hypothetical intent of the actual parties;
3) The hypothetical intent of hypothetical parties.
Id. at 166. As a court proceeds down this list, each step represents an increase in
expectation costs (defined as the costs of lost court legitimacy and public confidence
in the sanctity of contract).
55. Id. at 178.
56. Cf. id. at 178 (stating that hypothesizing what ideally situated parties would do
is a mask for the goal of efficiency).
57. Id.
58. See id at 178.
59. Id
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issue.60 Because the efficiency default seeks the term to which ideally
situated parties would have bargained without transaction costs, the
party who originally had superior bargaining power will lose an ad-
vantage.6' The party in the stronger position would have forced the
weaker party to bear the risk or added expense of a term even if it was
not the jointly efficient term.62 If the benefits to one party of superior
bargaining power are legitimate, a court should not deprive a party of
those benefits.
63
Regardless, a court that imposes a default term-for efficiency's
sake-that does not reflect what the parties would have wanted, risks
decreasing the efficiency of an agreement. Courts seeking the most
efficient way of allocating risk among the parties are as prone to err in
selecting the efficient term as are those courts that would impose the
term selected by the majority of parties.6' It is difficult both to deter-
mine the most efficient term and to determine the most popular term.
Professor Coleman recognized that judges lack the information to
make informed determinations of what is the most efficient term.65
He stated that:
Even though the court in applying the relevant default rule aims to
promote efficiency, there is no reason to think that it will do a better
60. See id. at 180-81. Professor Coleman states that:
There are technical and substantive objections to imposing on parties ex post
what they would have bargained to ex ante. The technical problem arises
when a court is asked to determine ex post what parties would have bar-
gained to ex ante. This problem is complicated by the fact that the litigants
are likely to offer very different accounts ex post of their ex ante preferences.
The incentive to behave strategically may well be overwhelming. Determin-
ing what is fair or efficient may turn out to be considerably easier than deter-
mining what the parties would have agreed to.
The normative problem is more troublesome. What parties to an agree-
ment would have agreed to is a function of their relative bargaining
strengths. A person's bargaining strength depends on endowments, informa-
tion available, alternative opportunities, and the like. Even if a court could
determine how the parties would have allocated risks ex ante, in doing so it
may be doing no more than reinforcing bargaining inequalities. In short,
courts may not be particularly well suited to determine ex post what parties
would have bargained for ex ante, and even if they could, courts might well
exacerbate, rather than alleviate, relative bargaining inequalities.
It is one thing for a court to recognize and enforce bargains that are the
result of inequalities in relative bargaining positions when the parties have
explicitly agreed to them; it is another for a court to impose unfair alloca-
tions of rights and responsibilities in the absence of an explicit agreement
among the parties to do so.
Id.
61. Id. at 178.
62. Id.
63. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 48, § 4-4, at 193.
64. Coleman, supra note 20, at 180 ("Individuals will be inclined to rely upon
courts to promote their joint wealth, but only to the extent to which they believe that
courts are better suited to determine what's in their interest than they are.").
65. Id.
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job than will the particular contracting parties. The parties, them-
selves, also act to maximize their wealth. Whether they are success-
ful often turns on the same considerations that determine whether
courts will succeed, for example, the adequacy of information.6
To supply the most efficient term when gap-filling, courts should sup-
ply a term consistent with the hypothetical intent of the actual par-
ties.67 Interpretation of a contract in a way that gives legal effect to
the actual will of the actual parties is highly efficient. Thus, it makes
sense for a court to supply a term that is consistent with what the
actual parties would have chosen; such a term is presumptively effi-
cient.68 Regardless, it is clear that a single default term cannot meet
party expectations and cannot be justified on those grounds.
III. THE DEBATE OVER THE PROPER STANDARD-OF-CARE TERM
FOR THE RUPA
The problem with single default terms is borne out by the debate
between those courts and commentators supporting the application of
the business-judgment rule to partnerships and those who support an
ordinary care standard for partnerships. The UPA provides no stan-
dard-of-care term.69 In the absence of an express term, the judicial
approach under the UPA has been to provide a default term of ordi-
nary care that applies to all partnerships in which the partners failed
to designate a standard-of-care term.7" Under the UPA (as with all
single default terms) courts need not look to the nature of the partner-
ship or any other surrounding circumstances when applying the single
default term.7
66. Id
67. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 93 (4th ed. 1992). Judge
Posner stated:
What about cases in which the parties' intentions, as gleaned from the lan-
guage of the contract or perhaps even from testimony, are at variance with
the court's notion of what would be the efficient term to interpolate into the
contract? If the law is to take its cue from economics, should efficiency or
intentions govern? Oddly, the latter.
Id.
68. See id
69. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 111.
70. See generally Beveridge, supra note 17 (surveying American and English cases
applying the ordinary care standard). Similarly, Professor Dickerson has explained
that:
In recognizing a duty of care between or among partners, the courts have
looked to UPA section 18, a provision that focuses on management. UPA
section 4(3) also addresses fiduciary concepts, albeit more indirectly; it states
that principles of agency law survive the adoption of the UPA. Therefore,
the fiduciary duties owed by a partner to the partnership include those owed
by an agent to its principal: both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.
Dickerson, supra note 13, at 115 (citations omitted).
71. Thus there is no need to inquire into circumstances that cannot possibly affect
the selection of the default term; there is a choice of one.
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Eighty years subsequent to its original drafting, the UPA, currently
the law in all of the states except Louisiana,72 has been overhauled
and the revised act soon will be presented to the individual states as a
replacement for the UPA. The revised act provides that the duty of
care among partners, instead of one of ordinary care, is a lesser
duty-a duty to avoid gross negligence.
A. Justifications For UPA's Ordinary Care Standard and Some
Weaknesses Therein
Scholars have advanced several arguments for the adoption of an
ordinary care standard by the RUPA. First, they argue that the case
law supports the ordinary care standard.73 Second, they claim that
agency principles underlying partnership law support the ordinary
care standard.74 Third, they assert that because ordinary care is the
current standard, and because partnership is the only business organi-
zation affording such a high duty of care, people expect and rely upon
the ordinary care standard.75
1. Common Law Authority
Some commentators argue that the RUPA standard should be ordi-
nary care-holding partners liable to the partnership for their acts of
ordinary negligence-because it is the standard interpretation by
courts under the UPA.76 Accordingly, they argue that the RUPA's
position-which in essence adapts corporate law's business-judgment
rule to the partnership context77 -is inconsistent with the case law .78
The drafters of the RUPA claim that the courts have already adopted
72. Id.
73. See infra part III.A.1.
74. See infra part III.A.2.
75. See infra part III.A.3.
76. Beveridge, supra note 17, at 756-60 (surveying English and American cases
purportedly consistently applying ordinary care standard); see also Dickerson, supra
note 13 (arguing that case law supports the ordinary care standard).
77. See supra note 19. Professor Eisenberg discussed the business-judgment rule
in the corporate context in a recent article stating that:
The business-judgment rule consists of four conditions, and a special stan-
dard of review that is applicable, if the four conditions are satisfied, in suits
that are based on the substance or quality of a decision a director or officer
has made, as opposed to the decision-making process he utilized to arrive at
his decision.
The four conditions are as follows:
First, a judgment must have been made. So, for example, a director's
failure to make due inquiry, or any other simple failure to take action-
as opposed to a decision not to act-does not qualify for protection of
the rule.
Second, the director or officer must have informed himself with respect
to the business judgment to the extent he reasonably believes appropri-
ate under the circumstances-that is, he must have employed a reason-
able decision-making process.
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the business-judgment rule, and that the revised act only codifies the
existing case law.79
2. Extension of Agency Principles
Advocates of the UPA standard also argue that the ordinary care
standard is a natural extension of agency principles which survive in
the UPA80 and which are closely akin to partnership law."' In agent-
principal relationships, the agent's duty-absent an agreement to the
contrary-is to use ordinary care in conducting the principal's busi-
ness.' Thus, Professor Dickerson claims that because the duty an
agent owes to her principal is one of ordinary care, and because part-
Third, the decision must have been made in subjective good faith-a
condition that is not satisfied if, among other things, the director or of-
ficer knows that the decision violates the law.
Fourth, the director or officer may not have a financial interest in the
subject matter of the decision. For example, the business-judgment rule
is inapplicable to a director's decision to approve the corporation's
purchase of his own property.
If these four conditions are met, then the substance or quality of the direc-
tor's or officer's decision will be reviewed, not under the basic standard of
conduct to determine whether the decision was prudent or reasonable, but
only under a much more limited standard.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Re-
view in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 441 (1993).
78. See Beveridge, supra note 17, at 756 (arguing that the courts consistently apply
an ordinary care standard, and that cases holding partners individually liable for their
acts of "culpable negligence" are not applying a lower standard of care, but in actual-
ity are applying a poorly termed ordinary care standard). But see Bane v. Ferguson,
890 F.2d 11, 14-15 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (holding that under business-judgment
rule, a law firm is not liable to a former partner for alleged negligent management
that affected the retired partner's non-contractual pension payments); Ferguson v.
Williams, 670 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). In Ferguson, the court stated:
[W]e hold as a matter of law that negligence in the management of the af-
fairs of a general partnership or a joint venture does not create any right of
action against that partner by other members of the partnership. It is only
where there is a breach of trust, such as when one partner or joint venturer
holds property or assets belonging to the partnership or venture, and con-
verts such to his own use, would such action lie. In the ordinary manage-
ment and operation of a general partnership or joint venture there is no
liability to the other partners or joint venturers for the negligence in the
management or operation of the affairs of the enterprise ....
Id. at 331.
79. UPA Revision Subcommittee, supra note 16, at 151.
80. UPA, supra note 2, § 4(3); Dickerson, supra note 13, at 122.
81. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 122 ("Agency law resembles partnership law in its
application of fiduciary duties.").
82. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 379(1) (1957). Section 379(1) states that
"[ulnless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to act with
standard care and with the skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work
which he is employed to perform and, in addition, to exercise any special skill that he
has." Id.
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nership relations are grounded in the law of agency, a partner's duty
must be to use ordinary care.83
While it is true that agency law provides much of the foundation of
partnership law,84 allowing partnerships to be governed by rules
formed by blind analogy to agency law is a mistake. 85 It is unreasona-
ble to assume that all organizations that choose the partnership form
do so to obtain an agency relationship among the partners.86
Although presuming the existence of close, personal agent-principal
relations among the partners may be reasonable in some partnerships,
such a presumption may be inaccurate in other partnership settings.
Frequently, partnership is the business form of choice because it is
easy to create. Additionally, it is possible that the partners desired to
avoid an agent/principal relationship so that they might share the risk
of negligence judgments. Consequently, the presumption that one
partner seeks an agency relationship with the other partners that
reaches the fiduciary level, making each partner solely liable for her
own negligence, is questionable.
3. Partnership Expectations
Professor Dickerson also argues that those who form partnerships
do so because they expect and desire to obtain a high duty of care
among partners. 87 Further, Professor Dickerson argues that partner-
ship law must provide a high standard of care as an alternative to the
set of lower fiduciary duties of corporate law.88 However, not all part-
nerships are formed to achieve high fiduciary duties-many are
formed for tax and other reasons.89 Consequently, imposing a default
term that supplies a high standard of care based on an assumption that
all partners or partnerships desire a high duty of care is erroneous.
Due to its inflexible nature, a single term will sometimes supply a
term inconsistent with the expectations of the partners.90 The desire
to provide a "partnership haven" with a high default standard of care
to those who expect refuge there does not justify thrusting that "ha-
83. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 121. The law of agency does, however, contem-
plate situations where the agent and principal agree to be governed by a gross negli-
gence standard (essentially that of the business-judgment rule). The comment to
§ 379(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency states that "[a]n agreement with the
principal that the agent is not to be liable to him for negligence not of a gross charac-
ter is legal." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 379(1) cmt. a (1957).
84. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 121.
85. See Alan R. Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein, Special Release on the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act 55-56 (1993) [hereinafter Special Release].
86. See Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 172 n.5.
87. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 155.
88. Id. at 156.
89. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
90. See Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 172 n.5; Thel, supra note 5, at 1384 n.16.
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ven" on those who expect otherwise, but who have failed to make
their intention clear.9 1
Any rule that proffers "meeting partner expectations" as its justifi-
cation must meet, or come as close as possible to meeting, every part-
nership's expectations. The NCCUSL, through its promulgation of
the RUPA, is not justified in continuing a scheme that will disappoint
many partnerships' expectations. 93
B. Justifications for the RUPA Business-Judgment Rule and Some
Weaknesses Therein
Unlike the UPA, the RUPA squarely tackles the duty-of-care issue.
RUPA section 404(d) states that "[a] partner's duty of care to the
partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding up of
the partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a
knowing violation of the law." 94
Judge Posner has argued that because of partnership's contractual
nature, the business-judgment rule, although a corporate law notion,95
is even more appropriate in the partnership context.96 Section 404(d)
leaves the parties the responsibility to contract for a high duty of care
if so desired, and leaves a low standard of care for its default term.97
Advocates of the business-judgment rule's adaption to partnership
governance offer three main arguments. They argue that low stan-
dards of care are relatively efficient at discouraging partner negli-
gence,98 that the business-judgment rule encourages partners to make
risky, but wise, investments," and that partners desire a low standard
of care so as to share the costs of their ordinary negligence. 10°
1. Low Standards of Care are Efficient at Discouraging Partner
Negligence
The first argument in support of the inclusion of the business-judg-
ment rule in the RUPA is that a high standard of care is needed even
less in the partnership context than it is in the corporate context. This
claim is defended on the grounds that because partners are owners as
well as managers, they have a strong interest in monitoring the actions
of their partners to weed out negligence and increase the overall part-
91. See Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 172 n.5; see also Coleman, supra note 20, at 178
(noting that not all parties desire the court to supply "efficient" terms).
92. See Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 171.
93. See id.
94. RUPA, supra note 2, § 404(d) (emphasis added).
95. See Dickerson, supra note 13, at 142.
96. Bane v. Ferguson, 890 F.2d 11, 14-15 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.).
97. See Dickerson, supra note 13, at 147.
98. See infra part III.B.1.
99. See infra part III.B.2.
100. See infra part III.B.3.
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nership pie from which their share of the profits is to be drawn. 0 1
Each partner additionally faces the danger of expulsion"~ should her
actions result in losses to the partnership. Thus, by imposing a single
default term of ordinary care, those people who form partnerships
must waste resources contracting around the unneeded protection of
tort law.10 3 The partners themselves are ultimately believed to be the
most efficient guarantors of careful partner actions.1 °4
2. A High Duty of Care Impedes the Ability of Partners to
Manage the Partnership
A second argument offered for the adoption of the business-judg-
ment rule by the RUPA basically tracks the corporate law justification
for the rule. It holds that partners, as managers, must have the free-
dom to seize valuable partnership opportunities on behalf of the part-
nership. Sometimes these opportunities are risky, but ultimately they
may be wise investments. If the partners are held personally liable
(that is, they have no action for contribution from the partnership) for
losses incurred in an attempt to act on the partnership's behalf, they
will be less likely to seize valuable opportunities for the partner-
ship.'05 Professors Bromberg and Ribstein have stated that:
[T]he risk of harm to the partnership [of a partner's ordinary negli-
gence] is frequently outweighed by the need to give the partner suf-
ficient leeway to exercise discretion on behalf of the partnership.
The difference between a partner and a paid agent, of course, is that
the partner is subject to individual liability for partnership debts, so
that legal liability is less necessary to encourage the agent [partner]
to act carefully.' 0 6
3. Partners Desire to Share the Costs of Their Ordinary
Negligence
A third justification for the business-judgment rule in the partner-
ship context is that partnerships expect to have their actions judged by
the rule. Some people who form partnerships do so with every intent
to treat losses resulting from ordinary negligence as a cost of doing
business to be shared equally by the partners. Therefore, the busi-
ness-judgment rule advocates claim that it makes sense to apply the
business-judgment rule to partnerships. While it is possible that many
people form partnerships with the intent to have a low standard of
101. See Special Release, supra note 85, at 56 ("The partners have ample incentives
to monitor their co-partners because of their liability for partnership debts and their
equal contributions to the firm.").
102. See RUPA, supra note 2, § 601(3) & (4).
103. See id.; Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 1, § 6.07(0, at 6:85.
104. See Bane v. Ferguson, 890 F.2d 11, 14-15 (7th Cir. 1989).
105. Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 1, § 6.07(f), at 6:85-:86.
106. Id. (citation omitted).
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care, it is certainly not the only possibility. As Professor Dickerson
notes, many partnerships form to obtain the high fiduciary duties and
high standard of care provided under the UPA. 1°0 This is really the
difference between the two standards of care. Whether the partners
intended to share the costs of their ordinary negligence determines
what standard of care they would have chosen.108
C. The Advocates of Both Standards of Care are Fighting the
Wrong Battle
It is simple to explain the contrasting views that exist regarding the
proper standard of care that a partner owes the partnership."°9 The
law and economics scholars and those who would retain the status quo
under the UPA attack each other's standard-of-care position by ana-
lyzing worst-case scenarios. By applying each side's standard to situa-
tions where it is clearly inappropriate, both sides illustrate why a
single default term cannot consistently meet partnership
expectations." 0
Some criticize the application of the UPA's high default standard of
ordinary care on the grounds that such a standard breeds inefficiency
in the process of partnership formation,"' and that it restricts the abil-
ity of partners to make decisions that although risky, are valuable
partnership opportunities." 2
In contrast, the proponents of the ordinary care standard argue that
applying the business-judgment rule to partnerships conflicts with the
desires of those who form partnerships to create high fiduciary duties
among partners," 3 and deprives those people of a business organiza-
tion that can supply those duties." 4
Both schools correctly assert that the other's standard is inconsis-
tent with partner expectations in some situations. This inconsistency
stems from the varied factual circumstances under which partnerships
form and operate which result in varying attitudes and expectations
regarding the sharing of the costs of ordinary negligence. Thus it is
clear that the only type of default rule that can consistently meet part-
ner expectations is one that is textured to account for disparate factual
circumstances; primarily, whether the partners view each other as risk
sharers or not. A hypothetical clearly illustrates this proposition.
107. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 155-56.
108. See infra part III.C.
109. Compare Dickerson, supra note 13, at 148 (supporting ordinary care standard)
with Bane v. Ferguson, 890 F.2d 11, 14-15 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (applying busi-
ness-judgment rule to a partnership case).
110. Compare Dickerson, supra note 13, at 119 (claiming that small and inadver-
tently formed partnerships expect ordinary care standard) with Bane, 890 F.2d at 14-
15 (stating that large professional partnerships expect to contract to the desired term).
111. Bane, 890 F.2d at 14-15.
112. Bromberg & Ribstein, supra note 1, § 6.07(f), at 6:85-:86.
113. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 154-55.
114. Id.
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A Hypothetical
Recall the three-doctor partnerships discussed in the Introduction.
Now suppose that in each partnership, one doctor negligently treats a
patient who then sues the partner individually and the partnership as
an entity.115 The suit against each partnership is made possible by the
partnership statute which creates joint and several liability among the
partners. Subsequently, the patient enforces the judgment against the
partnership."16
Begin by applying these facts to the case of the first partnership in
which the three doctors are of comparable competence, and are famil-
iar with each other's skill level. Perhaps the three chose to form a
partnership to reduce the variability in their expected incomes. By
pooling their gains and losses, they can smooth their expected income
stream.' 17 In such a situation it is quite possible that had they ad-
dressed the issue, the partners would have chosen a gross negligence
standard-thereby instituting loss sharing in cases of ordinary negli-
gence by a partner." 8
Now apply the same facts to the second medical trio-where the
three doctors are brothers and the two older brothers took the third
one into their partnership (even though he went to medical school in
the Dominican Republic) because it was their father's dying wish for
them to do so. Being graduates of Prestigious Medical School, the
elder brothers surely would select a high standard of care to govern
their partnership-thereby insulating themselves from judgments
against their less-skilled brother. Because the two elder brothers ex-
pect there to be more frequent judgments against their less-skilled sib-
115. See RUPA, supra note 2, § 305(a); UPA, supra note 2, § 13.
116. See UPA, supra note 2, § 13. The UPA states that:
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary
course of the business of the partnership or within the authority of his co-
partners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the
partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to
the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
Id. The RUPA provision is in accord with UPA § 13. RUPA, supra note 2, § 305(a).
117. See RUPA, supra note 2, § 401(b) ("A partnership shall credit each partner's
account with an equal share of the partnership profits.").
118. Professor Weidner, the reporter for the RUPA wrote:
It is not clear what duty of care rule would be included in most partnership
agreements if the matter were addressed .... If they believe that negligent
injuries are an inevitable series of costs that over time will be imposed ran-
domly and equally by all partners, a contract to share losses seems a likely
outcome. In such a situation, an agreement to share losses primarily affects
the timing of a partner's loss, not the amount of her loss. The agreement to
share losses in effect allows each partner to amortize the losses she in-
curs .... An assumption of equality, therefore, may explain the opinion of
those who believe that partners tacitly agree to share the losses caused by
each other's ordinary negligence.
Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership
Act, 46 Bus. Law. 427, 468 (1991).
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ling than against themselves, they will expect he alone to bear the cost
of his malpractice, because had they addressed the matter, they would
have chosen an ordinary care standard.
In the latter partnership, ordinary care appears to be the standard
of care consistent with partnership expectations. Such a standard
would make the negligent partner (brother) liable to the partnership
for any judgment paid by the partnership arising out of his own negli-
gence.119 In the former partnership, the RUPA's single default term
conforms to the partnership's expectations by treating the cost of ordi-
nary negligence as a cost of doing business to be shared equally by all
the partners.'20
The hypothetical above exposes the weakness inherent in both the
UPA and the RUPA default terms. Each would apply a single stan-
dard of care to both of these very different situations. While single
default terms are less costly gap-fillers than those that require a court
to look to the facts of a case, such inflexible terms make it impossible
for courts to consistently provide terms that meet the expectations of
partnerships in factually disparate situations.12 1 Both the UPA and
RUPA single default terms are appropriate some of the time because
sometimes the chosen single standard will reflect partnership expecta-
tions by chance. The flaw lies not with the substantive terms them-
selves, but rather lies in the fact that as single default terms, they
apply without regard to the situation. Thus, the key to proper gap-
filling lies in finding a way to supply the right term at the right time.
IV. SUPPLYING THE RIGHT TERM AT THE RIGHT TIME
The RUPA revision committee "determined that the primary focus
of the statute should be the small partnership, including the inadver-
tent partnership, since larger partnerships generally have a partner-
ship agreement addressing, and often modifying, many of the
provisions of the partnership statute."'" It is believed that, unlike
small partnerships, large partnerships are unlikely to fall victim to a
default rule inconsistent with the expectations of the partners. In ne-
gotiating the partnership agreement-which large partnerships nearly
always have2-any offensive default terms likely will be pointed out
by counsel. 24 Moreover, if terms are offensive to the partners, the
partners will contract around them.' s
119. See Beveridge, supra note 17, at 765-66.
120. Weidner, supra note 16, at 468.
121. See Coleman, supra note 20, at 178; Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 171.
122. Discussion Draft, supra note 33, at 44.
123. See id
124. Large partnerships are nearly always represented by counsel and will contract
around the RUPA as a form of standard contract. Id
125. See id; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 99.
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There is a point at which the cost of deviating from party expecta-
tions in the gap-filling process becomes unacceptable. The cost of a
streamlined gap-filling process-in terms of lost legitimacy of the gap-
filling process and the contracting public's lost confidence in the
"sanctity of contract,"z26
-outweighs many benefits of streamlining
the gap-filling process. At such a point, the court must tailor the pro-
cess to discern terms that comport with partner expectations and
spend its resources to supply a gap-filler that truly reflects partnership
expectations.
Additionally, courts must supply some standard of care to hear a
suit among the partners involving indemnification or contribution.
There also exists, however, a limit to how much time and money
courts and litigants can spend in a search of the default term that re-
flects the actual intent of the parties. Thus, an imperfect world de-
mands the sacrifice of some party autonomy and expectations to
facilitate the courts' enforcement of partially incomplete agreements.
Theoretically, it is possible to nearly eliminate the negative effects
associated with disappointing partnership expectations by refusing to
enforce an agreement until it is determined what the parties would
have done by considering evidence of subjective intent. Such a result,
however, would require a highly individualized probe into the parties'
subjective intent. The lack of individualized probes into party intent
in most gap-fillers127 implicitly acknowledges that there is a limit to
the amount of court and litigant resources we are willing to exchange
for reducing expectation costs.
Similarly, monetary costs to courts and litigants may be reduced by
a gap-filling scheme with only a single default term, but this would
result in high expectation costs. While efficiency costs are paid out of
the county coffers, expectation costs are much more difficult to quan-
tify, 28 though just as problematic. 129 Of the possible solutions to the
126. See Lon Fuller & William Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
in Readings in the Economics of Contract Law 77 (1936) (Goldberg ed. 1989).
127. But see U.C.C., supra note 29, § 2-305 (allowing a court to supply a "reason-
able" price); Kalevitch, supra note 3, at 219, which states that "[§ 2-305] does not
impose any particular price but calls for a 'reasonable price,' which leaves parties free
to present evidence as to what they thought was a reasonable price." Id. This ap-
proach is not quite as liberal as it seems. The U.C.C. provides for several "reason-
able" terms which are easily determined through-in the case of price-the market
price at the time, or through well known customs or trade practices.
128. See generally Kalevitch, supra note 3 (espousing the "will" theory of contract
based on respecting party expectations, no matter how unconventional because the
cost of disappointing party expectations is too high).
129. Id. Cf. Thel, supra note 5, at 1383-84 (noting the authors' choice to sacrifice
party expectations to achieve efficient gap-filling in the context of sharing capital
losses). In his review of Professor Bromberg's and Professor Ribstein's partnership
treatise, Professor Thel states:
[T]he authors might be expected to propose a more textured rule; however,
they seem to feel that a single default rule should govern the sharing of capi-
tal losses. A set of clear and simple default rules may reduce litigation costs
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problem of balancing the desire for efficient gap-filling and the neces-
sity of meeting partner expectations, a textured rule that allows a
court to look to factors and apply differing standards in different cases
offers the best hope for attaining the proper balance.
This Note proposes three factors that courts should consider in de-
ciding under what standard of care to judge the actions of partners.
Professor Weidner, the reporter for the RUPA, has stated that default
terms should be selected so as to supply terms the partners would
have chosen. 130 The factors, which are designed to flesh out to what
standard of care the partners would have bargained, will enable courts
to supply terms the partners considered to be "implicit in their part-
nership agreements."'13' A court may then supply a term it deems
consistent with what the partners believed to be implicit in their
agreement.
The first factor a court should look to is the duration or expected
duration of the partnership. If the partnership has operated for many
years, or by its nature must operate for many years, then it is more
likely that the partners expected to share the losses incurred as a re-
sult of their ordinary negligence. As Professor Weidner stated, "If
[the partners] believe that negligent injuries are an inevitable series of
costs that over time will be imposed randomly and equally by al part-
ners, then a contract to share losses seems a likely outcome.' 132 Thus,
where the partnership's duration is lengthy or is expected to be
lengthy, the business-judgment rule is the standard of care more con-
sistent with partnership expectations. Conversely, where the partner-
ship is limited in duration, loss-sharing over time is less of a
possibility, and thus, an ordinary care standard is more appropriate.
A second factor relates to each individual partner's record for negli-
gence during her time as a partner. Partners may be willing to share
the burden of negligence judgments (by adopting the business-judg-
ment rule) if they believe that their decision to share the burden, in
effect, insures their risk of having a negligence judgment rendered
against them and being forced to pay it individually. 133 This "insur-
ance" is practical only where judgments against the various partners
are spread randomly and equally.13 1 If there is a pattern of judgments
and be easier for the public to understand, but perhaps the arrangements
that partnerships would make cannot be stated in simple rules. If so, then
whatever simple rule is adopted will buy the benefits of simplicity at the
price of the expectations of some partnerships.
Id at 1384 n.16.
130. Id. (stating that the "basic idea" behind drafting default rules is to choose the
term the parties assume will be supplied).
131. Weidner, supra note 16, at 468.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Id. Professor Weidner analogized the risk self-insurance among partners to
what a tax person would dub a "loss-sharing agreement [that] avoid[s] a material dis-
tortion of income at the level of the individual partner." Id.
134. Id.
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against one or a few partners, then sharing the burden becomes bear-
ing the burden for the less-negligent partners,'135 and an ordinary care
standard is more consistent with partnership expectations.
Because partnership relations are affected by the knowledge that
the partners have about each other prior to formation, as a third fac-
tor, partners who lack knowledge about each other prior to formation
will expect a higher standard of care. 136 This is because business peo-
ple are generally cautious about with whom they associate. Thus,
partners who are less familiar with each others' business practices or
skills prior to formation will be less likely to agree to share the losses
resulting from a "stranger's" negligence. 37 Familiarity breeds trust,
and makes an agreement to share losses resulting from partners' ordi-
nary negligence more likely.' 31
After analyzing these factors, a court may better supply the stan-
dard of care most consistent with partnership expectations. While this
solution is not perfect-there will be times when the standard desired
by the partners is not supplied-it comes closer to consistently meet-
ing their expectations than any single default term could.
CONCLUSION
The status of partnerships as contractual relationships mandates
that any standard-of-care gap-filler be consistent with the expectations
of the partnership. The wide variety of circumstances surrounding the
formation, purposes and operations of partnerships makes it impossi-
ble for any single default term to consistently meet partner expecta-
tions. Therefore, a textured gap-filler provision is necessary to justify
enforcement of incomplete partnership agreements.
States must amend RUPA section 404(d) so that the standard-of-
care provision is a textured rule, allowing courts to analyze the factors
proposed by this Note and providing courts the discretion to choose
between the business-judgment rule and an ordinary care standard.
Such a flexible gap-filler provision will enable courts to distinguish
between people who form partnerships expecting to share the costs of
ordinary negligence and those people who form partnerships expect-
ing each partner to pay for her own negligence, and will allow courts
to consistently provide the standard of care that meets those
expectations.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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